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NOTES
liability for good faith enforcement of his or her duties imposed under this
Act."
This is to encourage peace officers to involve themselves in the protection
of abuse victims without fear of civil liability for an oversight or a mistake
in judgment.
Conclusion
The Oklahoma Protection from Domestic Abuse Act is a major social ad-
vancement in that it acknowledges the problem of domestic violence and pro-
vides a more effective remedy than ever before. If the courts, the prosecutors,
and the peace officers will use this tool the legislature has provided, the vic-
tims of domestic abuse will be able, for the first time, to secure real and
immediate protection from further abuse. If the legal system will immediately
"get tough" with abusers by arresting them, prosecuting them, and meting
out maximum penalties to them, potential abusers will get the clear message
that Oklahoma will not tolerate domestic abuse. Once the message is sent,
perhaps the Act will effectively prevent, as well as protect against, further
domestic violence.
Lee Ann Jones
Landlord and Tenant: Is Discrimination Against
Children Permissible in Oklahoma?
Since World War II the cornerstone of the American dream has been the
ownership of a single-family house in which the homeowner could rear his
family free from the intrusions of others. The passage of the National Hous-
ing Act' and the proliferation of government programs sponsored by the
Federal Housing Administration, the Veteran's Administration, and their more
sophisticated offspring have enabled the generations of young adults entering
the work force to realize that portion of the American drean from the period
beginning after World War II until the late 1970s. The advent of financial
disintermediation, unbridled inflation, astronomical interest rates, and govern-
mental insolvency has certainly damaged if not obliterated the average family's
ability to afford a single-family home. That revelation is an indication of a
basic adjustment in the economic structure of the American family. Just as
the escalation in the price of fuel has curtailed the family vacation, the escala-
tion of the price of single-family housing has forced a reexamination of the
housing accommodations this country affords to its residents.
Heretofore, discrimination in housing has been directed primarily at racial
groups and that discrimination has, of course, lost the legal sanctions it once
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g (1976).
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enjoyed.' A recent California case3 is in all probability a forerunner of another
wave of discrimination cases that will eventually realign the equities associated
with the enjoyment of housing as we have known it. Regardless of one's per-
sonal prejudices, it is almost amusing to realize that there currently exists
a legally sanctioned iscrimination against the American family in the alloca-
tion of available housing. This is found in the many apartment projects that
refuse families with children as tenants. As with all things, the law has a way
of allocating priority to those conflicts and issues based on the underlying
importance to the parties whose equities are being balanced. Given the
deterioration of the ability of the American family to buy a tract house,
discriminatory practices that preclude children take on a legal significance that
is compelled by economic necessity. In addition, such discrimination has
adverse social consequences.
A few problems thought to result from child discrimination in apartment
housing are inferior education, reduced proximity to employment, loss of
neighborhood relationships and contacts, social embarrassment, and similar
personal, business, and social consequences.4 It is also believed that child-
oriented exclusionary patterns encourage the flight of families from the cities,
decrease family-oriented neighborhoods and relationships, and contribute to
the decline in the quality of available housing.' The subsequent harm cuts
across all-racial, ethnic, and economic levels, but it falls most heavily on low-
income families.6
At the time of this note, six states have passed specific statutes prohibiting
discrimination against children in housing.7 Several other states have adopted
general provisions barring discrimination in housing on the basis of age, but
it is questionable whether these provisions preclude discrimination based upon
the presence of children.'
Perhaps the most serious problem with regard to child discrimination in
apartment housing exists in states that do not address the issue at all. These
states either have fair housing statutes that do not specifically prohibit
discrimination based on age, or like Oklahoma, do not have fair housing
statutes at all. In states like Oklahoma, the only remedy for such discrimina-
tion must be found in the so-called "public accommodation statutes." A
2. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). At least 40 states have passed fair hous-
ing laws or have provisions in state civil rights statutes barring discrimination on the basis of
race in the sale or rental of housing. Oklahoma is one of the states that does not have such a statute.
3. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
4. Fitzgerald & O'Brien, Apartment for Rent-Children Not Allowed: The Illinois Children
In Housing Statute-Its Viability and a Proposalfor Its Comprehensive Amendment, 25 DEPAUL
L. REv. 64, 65 (1975).
5. Note, Landlord Discrimination Against Children: Possible Solutions to a Housing Crisis,
11 Loy. L.A.L. Ray. 609, 611 (1978).
6. Id.
7. These states are Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York.
8. Trevalino, Suffer the Little Children-But Not in My Neighborhood: A Constitutional




number of states have this type of general civil rights legislation that follows
the lead of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 19641 and prohibits discrimination
based on race, color, religion, or national origin.'" However, the majority
of these statutes now prohibit discrimination in public accommodations based
on sex." The issue presented is whether statutes of this type are broad enough
to encompass discrimination against children in apartment housing.
The purpose of this note is to analyze Oklahoma's "public accommoda-
tion" statute'2 and suggest how the Oklahoma courts should interpret its pro-
visions when faced with the issue of child discrimination in apartment hous-
ing. The interpretation of Oklahoma's statute requires an examination of two
important issues that are determinative of the statute's applicability to
discrimination against children in apartment housing: (a) whether an apart-
ment project is a "place of public accommodation" within the terms of
Oklahoma's statute; and (b) whether children are a protected class under the
Oklahoma statute. As an aid to such analysis, this note will first examine
a recent California Supreme Court case that dealt with this issue when faced
with a public accommodation statute similar to Oklahoma's.'
The California Decision
In Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson,"4 the Supreme Court of California
reversed a municipal court's decision and held that a landlord may not lawfully
refuse to rent its apartments to a family solely because the family included
a minor child. Marina Point involved the following set of facts. Plaintiff,
Marina Point, Ltd., owned an 846-unit apartment project. In January of 1974,
Mr. and Mrs. Wolfson signed a one-year lease for an apartment in the Marina
Point project. Although the printed lease form states that no minors could
reside in the leased premises without the landlord's written permission, Marina
Point acknowledged that at the time the Wolfson lease was signed the landlord
followed a policy of renting apartments to families with children.
In October of 1974, Marina Point altered its rental policy with the objec-
tive of ultimately excluding all children. Marina Point decided that it would
allow the children already there to remain, but it would not enter into new
leases with tenants with children or with pregnant women. In February 1975,
the Wolfsons renewed their lease, and in September 1975, Mrs. Wolfson gave
birth to a son. In February 1976, the Wolfsons again renewed their lease,
apparently without informing the landlord of their child's presence. The new
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976).
10. Oklahoma's statute is of this type. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1402 (1981).
11. California's statute was amended in 1974 to prohibit discrimination based upon sex. CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 12955 (West 1980).
12. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1402 (1981): It is a discriminatory practice for a person to deny an
individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of a "place of public accommodation" because of race, color, religion,
or national origin.
13. CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West. Supp. 1977).
14. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
19831
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
lease made no reference to the child, but included the provision prohibiting
minors.
In the fall of 1976, Marina Point's management learned of the child's
presence in the apartment and informed the Wolfsons that their lease would
not be renewed because of the child's presence. Marina Point subsequently
agreed to a four-month extension, but required the Wolfsons to vacate their
apartment by May 31, 1977. When the Wolfsons failed to vacate the premises
at that time, Marina Point commenced an unlawful detainer action in municipal
court. The Wolfsons answered that the policy of discriminating against families
with children violated statutory and constitutional proscriptions" and hence
did not provide a lawful basis for their eviction.
The municipal court ruled in favor of Marina Point, rejecting the Wolfsons'
contention that Marina Point's policy violated either their statutory or con-
stitutional rights. The municipal court found that "the landlord's 'exclusion
of children . . . proceeds from a reasonable economic motive to promote
a quiet and peaceful environment free from noise and damage caused by
children.' "16 The Wolfsons appealed, asserting that both the Unruh Civil
Rights Act 7 and the Fair Housing Law" barred Marina Point's policy of
discrimination against families with children.'9
California's Unruh Act states that: "All persons within the jurisdiction of
this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever."
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the municipal court's holding
that the Unruh Act protects only the classes or persons specifically set forth
in the statute, or who come under the statute by judicial determination. The
municipal court had reasoned that because the statute did not specifically refer
to children or families with children, the Wolfsons were not a protected class
within the letter of the Unruh Act.
In discussing the municipal court's reasoning, the court relied on In re Cox,2
a California Supreme Court decision of a decade earlier. After reviewing the
origin, the legislative evolution, and the prior judicial decisions construing
15. See infra, notes 17, 18.
16. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 729, 640 P.2d 115, 119, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496, 501 (1982) (quoting the municipal court's memorandum opinion).
17. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 51-52 (West Supp. 1977). Technically, only § 51 constitutes the Unruh
Civil Rights Act. Section 52 supplies the remedies for its violation. However, the two sections
were enacted concurrently and § 52 is generally regarded as part of the Act.
18. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1980). The statute states: "It shall be unlawful: (a)
For the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against any person because of
the race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origins or ancestry of such person."
19. The Wolfsons also asserted that the exclusion violated their rights to familial privacy
and equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. California's
Supreme Court found that Marina Point's exclusionary policy violated the Unruh Act and therefore
did not address the Wolfsons' other contentions.




the Unruh Act and its predecessors, the Cox court had concluded that the
"identification of particular bases of discrimination-color, race, religion,
ancestry and national origin- . . . is illustrative rather than restrictive. " 21
Contrary to the municipal court's conclusion, the antidiscrimination provi-
sions of the Unruh Act were not intended to be restricted to only those classes
of persons specifically enumerated in the statute, but were intended to pro-
tect all persons from any arbitrary discrimination by a business establishment.22
Marina Point maintained that even if the municipal court erred in con-
cluding that the Unruh Act did not apply because families with children were
not a protected class, the judgment in its favor should nevertheless be affirmed
because its policy was "reasonable" and not "arbitrary" and therefore should
not be barred by the Unruh Act. Indeed, the court in Cox had stated:
In holding that the Civil Rights Act forbids a business establish-
ment generally open to the public from arbitrarily excluding a pro-
spective customer, we do not imply that the establishment may never
insist that a patron leave the premises. Clearly, an entrepreneur
need not tolerate customers who damage property, injure others
or otherwise disrupt his business. A business establishment may,
of course, promulgate reasonable deportment regulations that are
rationally related to the services performed and the facilities
provided.
23
Marina Point urged that the exclusionary policy fell within the category
of permissible regulations to which Cox had referred. In support of the con-
tention that the exclusionary policy was rationally related to a legitimate in-
terest in preserving an appropriate environment, Marina Point relied on the
case of Flowers v. John Burnham & Co. 24 In Flowers the court stated:
"Because the independence, mischievousness, boisterousness and rowdyism
of children vary by age and sex . . regulating tenants' ages and sex to that
extent is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
' 25
However, the supreme court dismissed Flowers as resting on a fundamen-
tal misconception of the statutory right afforded "all persons" by the Unruh
Act. Contrary to Marina Point's contention and the implication of Flowers,
"the Unruh Act does not permit a business enterprise to exclude an entire
class of individuals on the basis of a generalized prediction that the class 'as
a whole' is more likely to commit misconduct than some other class of the
public.
' 2,
21. Id. at 216, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
22. The Unruh Act had previously been held to apply to the business of renting housing
accommodations. See, e.g., Swann v. Burkett, 209 Cal. App. 2d 685, 26 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1962);
Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962). Cf. Burks
v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962).
23. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217, 474 P.2d 992, 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31 (1970).
24. 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971).
25. Id. at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
26. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 739, 640 P.2d 115, 125, 180 Cal. Rptr.
1983]
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The California Supreme Court emphasized that the basic right guaranteed
by the Unruh Act would be drastically undermined if a business enterprise
could bar from its premises entire classes of the public simply because the
owner of the enterprise had reason to believe that the class as a whole might
present greater problems than other groups.27 If Marina Point's contentions
were followed, the court reasoned, it would logically follow that children could
uniformly be excluded from virtually all business enterprises because most
businesses can claim a legitimate interest in eliminating excessively noisy,
rowdy, or boisterous conduct. Under the Unruh Act, entrepreneurs may
generally exclude those persons who are in fact disruptive, but cannot pursue
"a broad status-based exclusionary policy that operates to deprive individuals
of the services of the business enterprise to which section 51 grants 'all per-
sons' access."
2 8
Finally, Marina Point argued that even if the potential misbehavior of
children as a class did not justify the blanket exclusionary policy, the "no
children" policy could nonetheless be sustained as reasonable on the grounds
that the presence of children does not accord with the nature of its business
and of the facilities provided. In this regard, Marina Point attempted to
analogize the apartment project to such businesses as bars, adult book stores,
theaters, and senior citizen facilities that routinely exclude children from their
premises or services.
However, the California Supreme Court noted that the suggested analogy
clearly failed. Nothing in the nature of an ordinary apartment project is in-
compatible with the presence of families with children.29 The court pointed
out that prior to its decision to exclude children in 1974, Marina Point freely
rented its apartments to families with children and, even at the time of trial,
several families with children continued to reside in the project. The court
stated:
496, 507 (1982). As illustration, the supreme court cited two prior cases confirming the principle.
The first was Orloff v. L.A. Turf Club, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951). In Orloff
the court held that a race track manager could not exclude a person alleged to be a known
bookmaker based upon his reputation as a man of immoral character. The court stated that
absent evidence that the patron had engaged in some form of unlawful conduct while at the
track, the Civil Rights Act prohibited his exclusion. The second case relied on by the court was
Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951). Stoumen held that a business establish-
ment could not bar homosexuals simply because of their status as homosexuals. Absent some
unlawful or immoral conduct, the court said, his exclusion based upon membership in a class
was arbitrary.
27. ,As an example, the court pointed out that sailors or motorcyclists might find themselves
excluded as a class from certain places because proprietors could show that, statistically, members
of their occupation or vocation were more likely than others to be involVed in a disturbance.
28. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 740, 640 P.2d 115, 126, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496, 508 (1982).
29. One argument urged by the landlord was that the presence of swimming pools made
it dangerous to have children on the premises. However, the court noted that the pools were
part of the apartment complex long before the "adults only" program was instituted. Also,
the landlord had never sought to adopt the less restrictive practice of simply excluding children
from the use of the pools. Under those circumstances, the court determined that the presence
of the swimming pools could not possibly justify the landlord's broad exclusionary rule.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss2/25
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Although certain facilities offered by an apartment complex may
possibly be withheld from children pursuant to such a safety ration-
ale, a landlord cannot seize upon the availability of such inciden-
tal facilities as a justification for closing off all of its principal
services, i.e., housing accommodations, to the broad class of
families with children.
30
Unlike the exclusion of children from bars, adult book stores, or movie
theaters, Marina Point's exclusionary policy could not be defended by reference
to any statutorily sanctioned restrictions on the activities of children.3 ' Likewise,
the court distinguished the exclusionary practice in issue from the age-limited
admission policies of retirement communities or housing developments reserved
for older citizens. Such facilities are designed for the elderly and often have
particular appurtenances and exceptional arrangements for their specified pur-
poses and thus serve a specific social need. Also, both the state and federal
governments have enacted specific age-conscious legislation addressed to the
special housing needs of the elderly. 2
The court noted that in light of the public policy reflected by the legislative
enactments, age qualifications as to a housing facility reserved for the elderly
can operate as a reasonable and permissible means under the Unruh Act of
establishing and preserving specialized facilities for persons particularly in need
of such services. The court reasoned that a specialized institution created to
meet a specific social need differs fundamentally from the wholesale exclu-
sion of children from an apartment complex otherwise open to the general
public and that Marina Point could not possibly claim that the exclusionary
policy served any similarly compelling social interest.33
Thus, the California Supreme Court, when faced with the issue of discrimina-
tion against children in apartment housing, came to the well-reasoned conclu-
sion that such discrimination was prohibited by a statute very similar to
Oklahoma's. The court had previously determined that an apartment project
was a business establishment covered by the Unruh Act. Hence, it relied on
the fact that the Unruh Act was illustrative and not restrictive and therefore
was meant to prohibit all arbitrary discrimination to support its conclusion
that it is unlawful to prohibit all children from apartment complexes. The
court emphasized, however, that a business establishment may promulgate
reasonable deportment regulations that are rationally related to the services
performed and the facilities provided.
30. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 744, 640 P.2d 115, 129, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496, 510 (1982).
31. California has by statute made it unlawful to furnish alcoholic beverages to persons under
21 or to distribute "harmful matter" to another.
32. See, e.g., CAL. HEAL.TH & SAFETY CODE § 51230 (West 1979) (reserving a proportionate
share of state-financed low-income housing for occupancy by the elderly); 12 U.S.C. § 1701q
(1976) (federal loan program for housing for elderly families); 42 U.S.C. § 1485 (1976) (same).
33. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
Thus, the court emphasized that contrary to the dissenting opinion, the opinion of the court
does not bar age-limited admission policies of retirement communities or complexes reserved
for the elderly.
1983]
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Oklahoma's Public Accommodations Statute
Oklahoma's public accommodations statute reads as follows: "It is a
discriminatory practice for a person to deny an individual the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and ac-
commodations of a 'place of public accommodation' because of race, color,
religion, or national origin." ' 3' The term "place of public accommodation"
is statutorily defined and "includes any place, store or other establishment,
either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods or services to the general
public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public
or which is supported directly or indirectly by government funds.""
To determine whether Oklahoma's statute encompasses child discrimina-
tion in apartment housing, two questions must be answered. First, is an apart-
ment project a place of public accommodation and therefore within the scope
of Oklahoma's statute? Second, are the enumerated prohibited bases of
discrimination (i.e., race, color, religion, or national origin) merely illustrative
or are they restrictive?
Apartment Housing As a "Place of Public Accommodation"
There has been very little judicial interpretation in Oklahoma as to exactly
what is, or is not, a place of public accommodation. It is therefore an open
question as to the actual scope of Oklahoma's statute. However, Oklahoma
is not alone in this respect. In a nationwide sample of cases, a place of public
accommodation has been held to include a bathhouse,36 a bowling alley,
37
a dancing school,38 an elevator,3 1 a trailer park,'0 a dance pavilion," and a
movie theater.2 The difficulty in determining what is a place of public ac-
commodation lies with the failure of the courts adequately to set forth a lucid
standard for defining a "public accommodation," as the term is used in the
statutes.'
3
Oklahoma has had only one case specifically construing the statute defin-
ing "place of public accommodation." In Valentine v. City of Tulsa," Valen-
tine was alleged to have violated the Tulsa Public Accommodation Ordinance4
34. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1402 (1981).
35. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1401 (1981).
36. Norman v. City Island Beach Co., 126 Misc. 335, 213 N.Y.S. 379 (1926).
37. Central Amusement Co. v. District of Columbia, 121 A.2d 865 (D.C. 1956).
38. Crawford v. Kent, 341 Mass. 125, 167 N.E.2d 620 (1960).
39. Dean v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 183 11. App. 317 (1913).
40. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3 (1970).
41. Amos v. Prom, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Iowa 1954); Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse
Elec. R.R., 222 N.Y. 443, 119 N.E. 72 (1918).
42. United States v. Sampson, 256 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
43. Avins, What Is a Place of Public Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 68 (1968).
44. 518 P.2d 316 (Okla. 1973).
45. 25 OxU.A. STAT. § 1702 (1981) provides: "A political subdivision may adopt and enforce
an ordinance prohibiting discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin




when she refused to enroll a black child in preschool. Valentine challenged
the validity of the ordinance, stating that it was an enlargement of the state
statute. The court ultimately held that the preschool fell within the definition
of the ordinance and that the ordinance was not an enlargement of the statute
as applied to the facts of the case. "The legislative intent was to use the word
'includes'46 in the sense of enlargement; otherwise, such terms as 'any place'
or 'other establishment' would not have been used." 7 Therefore, the court
reasoned, the words of the statute are not limiting."'
It is a general rule of construction that a statute should be construed liberally
to give effect to the objects for which the statute was enacted.49 The section
of the statute enumerating the purposes and construction of the Act states:
"This Act . . shall be liberally construed to further the general purposes
stated in this Section and the special purposes of the particular provision
involved." 0
In light of the Valentine holding and the above quoted section of the statute,
it is clear that the statutory language used to define "place of public accom-
modation" was meant to be read very broadly. This is in accordance with
the purpose of the public accommodation statute. "The general purposes of
this Act are to provide for execution within the State of the policies embodied
in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and to make uniform the law of those
states which enact this Act."'"
When construing any statute or ordinance, the Oklahoma courts will at-
tempt to ascertain the intention of the legislative body. 2 This will ordinarily
be done by consideration of the language of the statute as a whole in light
of its general purposes and objectives, as well as an in-depth examination
of the legislative history of the statute.
53
The language in the statute states that any place which supplies goods or
services to the general public is a place of public accommodation. An apart-
ment project is certainly a "place" within the meaning of the statute, and
surely the act of providing housing accommodations is a service to the general
public. Thus, the language of the statute, when read liberally, would support
the proposition that an apartment project is in fact a "place of public accom-
modation" and is governed by the statute.
54
46. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1401 (1981). " 'place of public accommodation' includes any place,
store or other establishment ... ".
47. Valentine v. City of Tulsa, 518 P.2d 316, 319 (Okla. 1973).
48. Id. The court noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court had interpreted the New Jersey
Public Accommodation Statute the same way. Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 44 N.J. 480,
210 A.2d 208 (1965).
49. Stuart v. State, 522 P.2d 288 (Okla. Cr. App. 1974).
50. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1101 (1981) (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. Dolese Bros. Co. v. Privett, 622 P.2d 1080 (Okla. 1981); Riffe Pet. Co. v. Great Nat'l
Corp., 614 P.2d 576 (Okla. 1980).
53. Oklahoma Journal Pub. Co. v. City of Oklahoma City, 620 P.2d 452 (Okla. App. 1980);
Beall v. Town of Hennessey, 601 P.2d 758 (Okla. App. 1979).
54. Another provision of the statute itself would seem to suggest that apartment complexes
1983]
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Oklahoma courts should also be influenced by the fact that the California
Supreme Court came to the conclusion that an apartment project is governed
by the provisions of a statute (the Unruh Act) that does not specifically men-
tion apartment housing as being within its protection." The Unruh Act uses
the phrase, "in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."'5 6 While
at first glance this may seem broader than Oklahoma's statutory phrase, "place
of public accommodation," after one looks to the definition given this phrase,
the difference between the two is slight. Oklahoma's statute defines place of
public accommodation as including "any place, store or other establishment
. . . which supplies goods or services to the general public or which solicits
or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public.""7 This would seem
to correspond to the definition of "business establishment" as the phrase is
used in the Unruh Act. 8
Finally, it should be mentioned that several other jurisdictions with public
accommodation statutes have judicially determined that trailer parks are sub-
ject to regulation under such statutes." Trailer parks are analogous to apart-
ment projects in that both provide living accommodations to the general public
for persons staying on other than a temporary basis (as opposed to those
staying in hotels or motels). Because of the similarities in the types of services
offered by trailer parks and apartment projects, it is reasonable to conclude
that if a trailer park is a "place of public accommodation," then so also
are apartment projects.
In light of the liberal language of the statute, the broad legislative intent,
and the Valentine holding that the words of the statute are not limiting, it
would be appropriate for the Oklahoma courts to follow California's lead
in declaring apartment houses to be places of public accommodation.
Children As a Protected Class
The next step in interpreting Oklahoma's public accommodation statute is
are places of public accommodation. The statute states: "Place of public accommodation does
not include ... any establishment located within a building which contains not more than 5
rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of the establishment
as his residence." 25 OaA. STAT. § 1402(2) (1981). Read literally, this seems to indicate that
any building that contains more than five rooms for rent or hire will be considered a place of
public accommodation.
55. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
56. CAL.. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1977).
57. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1401 (1981).
58. It is also important to note that, at one time, California's Unruh Act also used the language
"public accommodation." In the late 1950s, however, the legislature became.concerned that courts
of appeal, narrowly defining the kinds of businesses that afforded public accommodations, were
improperly curtailing the scope of the public accommodation provision. Accordingly, it changed
the wording of the statute to "business establishment of every kind whatsoever." The important
factor is that the legislature did not intend to enlarge the scope of the statute by changing the
wording from "public accommodation" to "business establishment of every kind whatsoever,"
but rather only meant to protect the intended scope.
59. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3 (1970); Gregory




to determine if children, or families with children, are a protected class. The
statute itself sets out the categories of race, color, religion, and national origin
as bases of prohibited discrimination. The question is, were these classes meant
to be illustrative or restrictive? That is, should the specific enumeration of
certain classes of persons be taken as a signal that the legislature intended
only those persons to be protected under the statute, or that those persons
are only illustrative of the general intent to forbid all discrimination in regard
to a public accommodation? Again, in determining whether children are to
be included within the statute, it is necessary to look at the language of the
statute and the legislative objective.
A statute should be interpreted to produce a reasonable result and to pro-
mote, rather than to defeat, the general purposes and policies of the law.
It is a common rule of law that the apparent purpose of a statute should
not be defeated in favor of a literal construction of that statute." Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius ("mention of one thing in a statute implies exclu-
sion of another") is but a maxim and its application is not absolute nor univer-
sal. It is available as a tool by which the courts may construe legislative intent,
but if the intent of the legislature was not to make the statute exclusive, the
maxim is not to be applied." The maxim is but an auxiliary rule of construc-
tion and not a rule of substantive law. 2 Hence, that age or children are not
included as bases of discrimination does not absolutely preclude the possibility
of children, or families with children, being a protected class.
The only concrete evidence available to determine the legislative intent behind
the Oklahoma statute is that found in the act itself, its stated purpose being
to provide for execution of the policies embodied in the Federal Civil Rights
Act of 1964. There is no evidence in the legislative history of Oklahoma's
statute to indicate that the legislative intent was to limit the scope of the act
to the enumerated classes.
If the legislative intent was to limit the scope of the statute to only those
classes of persons specifically mentioned, absurd results would follow. Assum-
ing that the wording of the statute was intended to be restrictive rather than
illustrative, it would be permissible to exclude all classes of persofis from places
of public accommodation by reason of the fact that the class was not specifically
mentioned in the statute. For example, places of public accommodation could
bar all women, senior citizens, children, the handicapped, and any other iden-
tifiable class from entering their place of business.
In light of the broad legislative intent and the results that would ensue if
the language of the statute were interpreted to be restrictive and not merely
illustrative, Oklahoma courts should construe the Oklahoma statute to pro-
hibit all discrimination in places of public accommodation unless discrimina-
tion is based on reasonable deportment regulations that are rationally related
to the services performed and the facilities provided.
60. Phelps v. State, 598 P.2d 254 (Okla. Cr. App. 1979).
61. State v. Smith, 539 P.2d 754 (Okla. Cr. App. 1975).
62. Hardesty v. Andro Corp.-Webster Div., 555 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1976); In re Arbuckle Master
Conservatory Dist., 474 P.2d 385 (Okla. 1970).
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